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Abstract
We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose
one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with
one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between
the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game has
imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this game was considered
by Renault et al. (2005), who proved a folk theorem. Here we consider a discounted
version and a finitely repeated version of the game, and we strengthen our previous
result by showing that the set of equilibrium payoffs Hausdorff-converges to the feasible
set as either the discount factor goes to one or the number of repetition goes to infinity.
We show that the set of public equilibria for this game is strictly smaller than the set
of private equilibria.
AMS 2000 Subject Classification: Primary 91A20. Secondary 91A18.
JEL Classification: C72.
Keywords: Repeated games, imperfect monitoring, public equilibria, private equilibria,
Pareto-efficiency, discount factor.
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1 Introduction
Following a suggestion in Arthur (1994) many authors have considered a class of games called
minority games, where each player repeatedly acts trying to choose the action that is less
popular among all players. In the original problem considered by Arthur (1994) customers
like to go to El Farol bar on Thursday night, when it offers Irish music, but they deem it
enjoyable only if it is not too crowded. In many real life situations it is preferable to be in the
minority. Think for instance of a residential suburban area that is linked to downtown by two
main roads. Commuters have to decide every morning which road to take and, for obvious
reasons, they all want to avoid traffic. Since the commuter typically do not recognize their
fellow commuters on the road, but only perceive the existence of traffic, this phenomenon can
be modelled as a game with imperfect public monitoring. Even if the analysis of minority
games started considering situations involving a huge number of players, strategically it is
often more interesting to consider models with a small number of players. For instance
consider the case where each of three agents can satisfactorily carry out a procedure only if
a certain minimal throughput is obtained via a communication link. They can choose one of
two links and the minimal throughput is guaranteed only if one agent uses that link alone.
This is often the case when downloading data in P2P systems (see, e.g., Suri et al. (2005)).
In general this class of games is interesting when several agents must take decentralized
decision on whether to access a scarce resource, knowing that at most a fixed number of them
will be able to enjoy its benefits. Similar situations have been analyzed by the empirical
economic literature on market entry games (see e.g., Selten and Gu¨th (1982); Ochs (1990,
1995); Rapoport et al. (2002); Erev and Rapoport (1998)). In these models players must
decide independently whether to enter a market (and incur an entry cost). Since capacity is
limited, the entrants will reap a reward only if their number is smaller than a fixed threshold.
This clearly creates a problem of coordination.
Similar ideas have been used to analyze speculative behavior in financial markets, and
minority games have been used as a formalization of concepts, like the contrarian investment
strategy, previously considered in empirical studies (see e.g., De Bondt and Thaler (1985);
Chan (1988)). Most of the literature on the topic can be found in theoretical physics journals
and has a non-strategic approach where agents have bounded memory and act inductively,
i.e., they adjust their behavior according to their past experience. More precisely, at the
beginning each agent is endowed with a finite set of simple decision rules or strategies, which
are kept fixed throughout the game. At all subsequent stages each player evaluates the
performance of all her strategies in the last k outcomes and plays the best predictor, i.e.,
the strategy with the highest fitting score. Physicists then study the degree of coordination
that a population of N players exibihts when N is large, mainly exploiting concepts and
methodologies used in statistical mechanics of disordered systems. The reader is referred
to the recent books by Challet et al. (2005) and Coolen (2005) for a history of the prob-
lem, its statistical-mechanics analysis, and some applications to financial markets, and to
http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/minority/ for an extensive list of references.
An analysis of minority games from the learning viewpoint can be found in Bottazzi et al.
(2003, 2002); Bottazzi and Devetag (2004).
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Renault et al. (2005) are the first to consider a minority game from a traditional strategic
viewpoint. In their model an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of
two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room receive a reward of one euro.
The others receive nothing. The game is repeated over time. At each step, after the players’
actions, only a public signal (the majority room) is announced to everybody, so players do
not observe the actions or the payoffs of the other players. Notice that this is equivalent to
announcing to each player her own reward at each time, but not the reward of the other
players. Renault et al. (2005) prove that an undiscounted folk theorem holds for this game,
and characterize the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs, i.e. they show that any feasible payoff
is an equilibrium payoff. In particular, they construct a uniform equilibrium where the payoff
of each player is zero. This equilibrium can be considered as particularly inefficient, since all
feasible payoffs are non-negative.
A minority game is basically a repeated coordination game, the specific feature being that
players want to coordinate negatively and be where their fellow players are not. The stage
game used in a repeated minority game is strongly related to congestion games introduced
by Rosenthal (1973) and to crowding games studied by Milchtaich (1998, 2000).
The paper by Renault et al. (2005) is in the tradition of repeated games with imperfect
public monitoring. Examples of such games go back to Rubinstein (1979), Rubinstein and
Yaari (1983), and Radner (1985) with reference to principal-agent models and by Green
and Porter (1984) with reference to oligopoly. More systematic analyses of games with
imperfect public monitoring have been provided by Abreu et al. (1990) Fudenberg et al.
(1994), Fudenberg and Levine (1994), and Tomala (1998). These papers focus on perfect
public equilibria, namely, equilibria in which each player uses only strategies that depend on
the public signal and not on her private history.
Imperfect private monitoring was studied by Lehrer (1989, 1990, 1992a,b). The issue
of Journal of Economic Theory dedicated to this topic, with the introduction by Kandori
(2002), is a good source of reference on this literature (see also the book by Mailath and
Samuelson (2006)).
Our model deals with an intermediate situation where the signal is public, but strate-
gies are private, namely, they depend on the public signal and on the private history of
each player. Games with public monitoring and private strategies have been studied for
instance by Mailath et al. (2002) and Kandori and Obara (2006). Mailath et al. (2002) deal
with finitely repeated games and show three examples of substantially different behavior of
private versus public strategies in games with imperfect public monitoring. Kandori and
Obara (2006) consider infinitely repeated games and provide a method to construct private
strategies that are more efficient than public strategies.
In this paper we consider a discounted version and a finitely repeated version of the
minority game studied by Renault et al. (2005). We are able to prove that a version of the
folk theorem holds also for these games. In the discounted game, as the discount factor grows,
the set of equilibrium payoffs converges (in the Hausdorff metric) to the feasible set, namely,
to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game. The same convergence
result holds for the finite game, as the number of repetitions goes to the infinity. The
convergence theorems in this paper cannot be obtained by known results in the literature.
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For instance Lehrer (1989, 1992a,b) deals with two-player games only, Lehrer (1990) assumes
semi-standard information. Furthermore all these papers consider repeated games without
discounting. Abreu et al. (1990) consider pure strategy equilibria, keep the discoungt factor
fixed, and do not analyze convergence theorem. Fudenberg et al. (1994) impose a pair-wise
identifiability condition that is not satisfied by our game.
In the undiscounted case studied by Renault et al. (2005) the folk theorem was proved
by constructing specific equilibrium strategies whose payoff is one of the extreme points of
the feasible payoff set. In this paper we merely prove that all points in the feasible set can
be arbitrarily approximated by equilibrium payoffs if either the discount factor is big enough
or the game is repeated enough times.
In order to achieve this approximation we will make use of a strategy that allows the
players to punish a possibly deviating player with high probability, without even knowing
her identity. In games with imperfect monitoring identifying a deviator is an issue. It is
therefore important here to use a strategy that avoids this issue, namely, a strategy that
involves an effective punishment even if the deviator is not identified. A similar idea appears
already in Renault et al. (2005), although the strategy used in that paper is different. In that
paper the equilibrium strategy was based on a statistical test aimed at detecting possible
deviations from the equilibrium path. Once a likely deviation is detected, all players enact
a punishment that involves replaying the actions played at the periods that produced an
unexpected signal. This creates a situation where, with very high probability, the non-
deviating players are equally split between the two rooms, so the deviator is automatically
punished without any need to know her identity.
Folk theorems for finitely repeated games with perfect monitoring have been proved by
Benoit and Krishna (1985) in pure strategies and by Gossner (1995) in mixed strategies.
As we mentioned before, although in this game signals are public, we consider equilibria
in private strategies. We will show that if we consider only public equilibria the equilibrium
payoff set is strictly smaller, in particular, in the case of three players, it coincides with the
convex envelop of the Nash equilibrium payoffs of the one-shot game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 examines the
discounted game. Section 4 studies the finitely repeated game. Section 5 considers public
equilibria. All the proofs are contained in Section 6.
2 The model
There are two rooms: L(eft) and R(ight), and an odd number of players. At each stage, the
players have to choose simultaneously one of the two rooms. The player who finds herself in
the less crowded room (if any) gains a positive payoff of 1, and the most crowded room is
publicly announced before going to the next stage.
2.1 The stage game
The set of players is N = {1, . . . , 2n + 1}. For all i ∈ N denote by Ai = {L, R} the set
of actions for player i, and put A = ×i∈NA
i. For a = (a1, . . . , a2n+1) ∈ A define the payoff
5
function gi : A → R of player i as
gi(a) =
{
0 if card{j ∈ N \ {i}|aj = ai} ≥ n,
1 otherwise,
where, given a set B, card(B) is its cardinality.
For each subset S ⊂ N define eS as the payoff in R
N where each player in S gets 1, and
each player not in S gets 0. If S = ∅, then eS is just the null vector.
The set of feasible vectors is
S = conv{eS, S ⊂ N such that card(S) ≤ n},
where, if D is a subset of a Euclidean space, conv D is the convex hull of D. Looking at
extreme points, it is not difficult to show that:
S = {(x1, . . . , x2n+1) ∈ [0, 1]2n+1 :
2n+1∑
i=1
xi ≤ n}.
If n = 1, there are three players and it is easy to compute the set of Nash equilibria of
the stage game. These are the action profiles where one player plays L with probability 1
and one other player plays R with probability 1, plus the strategy profile where every player
plays the randomized action 1
2
L⊕ 1
2
R. In the general case where n is a positive integer, there
exist many more Nash equilibria of the stage game. They can all be described as follows:
• the equilibria where n players play L, and n players play R. In particular every eS,
with S ⊂ N such that card(S) = n, is an equilibrium payoff of the stage game.
• for every a and b in {0, . . . , n − 1}, there is an equilibrium where: a players play L,
b players play R, and all other players play the mixed action β L ⊕ (1− β) R, where
β ∈ [0, 1] is uniquely determined by n, a and b (e.g., β = 1/2 if a = b).
Since the stage game will be repeated, we also need notations about what the players
observe. We define the set of public signals as U = {L, R}. The signalling function ` : A →
U , giving the most crowded room, is formally defined by
`(a) =
{
L, if card{i ∈ N |ai = L} > card{i ∈ N |ai = R},
R, if card{i ∈ N |ai = L} < card{i ∈ N |ai = R}.
2.2 The repeated game
At each stage t ≥ 1, each player i (simultaneously with the other players) selects an action
ait ∈ A
i. If at = (a
1
t , . . . , a
2n+1
t ) ∈ A is chosen, the stage payoff of player i is g
i(at), and
the signal ut = `(at) is publicly announced. Then the play proceeds to stage t + 1. All the
players have perfect recall and the whole description of the game is common knowledge.
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The game has imperfect monitoring, in that the players do not observe the actions of
their opponents, but only a public signal (the majority room). This is equivalent to assuming
that each player observes only her own payoff, but not the payoff of the other players.
A behavioral strategy of player i is an element σi = (σit)t≥1, where for all t
σit : (A
i × U)t−1 → ∆(Ai).
Therefore, for each t ≥ 1, σit(a
i
1, u1, a
i
2, u2, . . . , a
i
t−1, ut−1) is the lottery played by player i
at stage t if she played ai1 at stage 1, . . . , a
i
t−1 at stage t− 1, and the signal was u1 at stage
1, . . . , ut−1 at stage t− 1.
We denote by Σi the set of behavioral strategies of player i, and Σ = ×i∈NΣ
i. A strategy
profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σ2n+1) ∈ Σ induces a probability measure Pσ over the set of plays
Ω = (A × U)∞ = {(a1, u1, a2, u2, . . . ), ∀t ≥ 1, at ∈ A, ut ∈ U)}. With an abuse of notation
we will denote by at the random variable of the joint action profile in A played at stage t.
2.2.1 The discounted game
For λ in ]0, 1], the payoff of player i (i ∈ N) in the λ-discounted game is
γiλ(σ) :=
∞∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1Eσ[g
i(at)] = Eσ
(
∞∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1gi(at)
)
,
where Eσ denotes the expectation computed according to Pσ. We denote by Eλ ⊂ S the set
of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the λ-discounted game.
2.2.2 The finitely repeated game
For T ∈ N+ the payoff of player i (i ∈ N) in the T -repeated game is
γiT (σ) :=
T∑
t=1
1
T
Eσ[g
i(at)].
We denote by ET ⊂ S the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the T -repeated game.
3 Convergence of Eλ
The main result in this section is the following, which shows that, as the discount factor
(1 − λ) grows, the set Eλ of equilibrium payoffs converges (in the Hausdorff metric) to the
feasible set S.
Theorem 3.1.
lim
λ→0
Eλ = S.
7
The idea behind the proof of Theorem 3.1 is the following. By standard convexification
properties, attention may be restricted to the extreme points of the feasible set S. For
each extreme point eS we will find, for λ small enough, a point in Eλ that is arbitrarily
close to eS. If |S| = n, eS ∈ E1 so a fortiori eS ∈ Eλ for all λ ∈ (0, 1). Consider now
S such that |S| = s ≤ n − 1. By symmetry we may restrict attention to the case where
eS = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0).
In order to find an equilibrium payoff that is arbitrarily close to eS, we proceed as follows:
fix λ, and start with an equilibrium payoff z = (q, . . . , q, y, . . . , y, w, . . . , w) ∈ Eλ, where s
players have payoff q, (n + 1 − s) players have payoff y, and n players have payoff w. The
quantities w and y will be required to satisfy some conditions, that are actually always met
by some equilibrium payoffs in Eλ. Given z, we get a new payoff z
′ ∈ Eλ such that the
distance between z′ and eS is significantly smaller than the distance between z and eS. This
payoff z′ is obtained by the following strategy profile:
• at stage 1 the first s players play R, the last n players play L and the remaining players
play L with probability 1−α and R with some probability α (denote this mixed action
as (1− α)L⊕ αR),
• at stage 2, if the signal was L, then all players play forever the equilibrium with payoff
z; if the signal was R, then each player plays forever the pure action taken at stage 1.
We want to prove that, for a suitable α, this strategy is an equilibrium.
If α is small, then, at stage 1, the last 2n+1− s players all play L with high probability,
hence the first s players are in the minority, the payoff is eS, and the public signal is L.
Consider that, given that the last n players play L, according to the above strategy
profile, at most n + 1 players can play R at stage 1. The first s players have no incentive to
deviate at stage 1 because they already play R and have a good chance to get a payoff of 1 at
this stage. The remaining 2n + 1− s players do not mind playing L with (at least) positive
probability, because if one of them plays R at stage 1, then with non-negligible probability
n + 1 players will be in room R and n players will be in room L. Since the strategy then
recommends to repeat forever the action of stage 1, the players in room R will have a null
payoff at every stage. So, no deviation at the following stages is profitable, either.
Intuitively, repeating forever the action of stage 1, if the public signal was R, may be
considered as a punishment phase having the following peculiarity: the players do not know
who did deviate, but still, with high probability, they are able to punish the deviating player,
if any, by staying in the same room. This idea of punishing a deviating player without
knowing its identity is an important feature of our strategy.
If α is small, then with high probability the payoff vector is λeS + (1− λ)z. This implies
that the equilibrium payoff z′ is closer to eS than the original payoff z was.
The above argument is formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Fix λ ∈ (0, 1), and
z = (q, . . . , q︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, y, . . . , y︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1−s
, w, . . . , w︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) ∈ Eλ (3.1)
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such that w ≥ y ≥ λ1/(m+1), where
m = n− s ≥ 1. (3.2)
Let
α =
(
λ
λ + (1− λ)y
)1/m
. (3.3)
Then
z′ = (q′, . . . , q′︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, y′, . . . , y′︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1−s
, w′, . . . , w′︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) ∈ Eλ
if
y′ = (1− λ)y,
w′ = (1− λ)w + αm+1(1− (1− λ)w),
1− q′ = (1− λ)(1− q) + αm+1(1− (1− λ)(1− q))
= (1− λ)(1− q) + αm+1(λ + (1− λ)q).
The rest of the proof of Theorem 3.1 is based on the following steps:
• We use Lemma 3.2 to prove that for λ small enough, there exist a payoff z ∈ Eλ such
that ‖z − eS‖ can be made arbitrarily small.
• We show that if (1− µ) = (1− λ)d for some integer d, then Eµ ⊂ Eλ.
• We consider that any point in S can be approximated with a convex combination of
its extreme points having rational coefficients with denominator d.
• We prove that the convex combination of any z1, . . . , zL ∈ Eµ with weights d1/d, . . . , dL/d
is close to the payoff obtained by cycling over z1 d1 times, z2 d2 times, . . . , zL dL times.
• We combine the last two approximations to achieve the result.
Following a request of a referee, we give a heuristic idea of why the proof works. Since the
most efficient outcome in the stage game (say, n players choose R and n + 1 players choose
L) is already a stage-game Nash equilibrium, the difficulty lies in supporting inefficient
outcomes, such as (1, 0, . . . , 0).
It is important to notice that we prove our result by contradiction (proof of Lemma 6.2):
we don’t construct an appropriate equilibrium of the λ discounted game, but, rather, we
prove its existence.
Given an equilibrium payoff z, the proof of Lemma 3.2 shows the way to support a
payoff z′ that is closer to (1, 0, . . . , 0). At stage 1 player 1 plays R, players 2, . . . , n + 1 play
αR⊕ (1− α)L, and players n + 2, . . . , 2n + 1 play L.
After that, if the public signal of stage 1 is L, then all players go on playing an equilibrium
with payoff z. This, together with the action at stage 1, will produce a payoff z ′, which is
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closer to (1, 0, . . . , 0)); if the public signal is R, then the players repeat forever their action
played at stage 1.
The calibration of α is very important. On the one hand it has to be big enough to
imply that player 1 is in best reply by playing R at stage 1 (the probability αn of all players
2, . . . , n+1 playing R is small enough). On the other hand it has to be small enough so that
if player 2 imitates player 1 and plays R at stage 1, then player 2 is not better off because
the probability αn−1 that all players 3, . . . , n + 1 play R is not that small. So no player has
an incentive to imitate player 1, even if with high probability player 1 will be alone at stage
1. This is because of the possible punishment, i.e., of what happens if the signal is R: this
punishment lasts forever, so has to be feared, even if a cheater only has a small probability
to get caught.
Lemma 6.2 proves that this way we can get as close as we want to the payoff (1, 0, . . . , 0).
4 Convergence of ET
In this section we will show that, as the number of times the game is repeated grows, the
set of equilibrium payoffs ET converges to the feasible set S.
Theorem 4.1.
lim
T→∞
ET = S.
Theorem 4.1 will be proved with a technique that resembles the one used for the proof of
Theorem 3.1. We will start with an equilibrium payoff in ET and we will find an equilibrium
payoff in ET+1 that is closer to an extreme point of S.
The key lemma is the following.
Lemma 4.2. Fix T ∈ N \ {0}, s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and
z = (q, . . . , q︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, y, . . . , y︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1−s
, w, . . . , w︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) ∈ ET (4.1)
such that
w ≥ y ≥
(
1
T + 1
)1/(m+1)
. (4.2)
Then
z′ = (q′, . . . , q′︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, y′, . . . , y′︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1−s
, w′, . . . , w′︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) ∈ ET+1,
with
y′ =
T
T + 1
y,
w′ =
T
T + 1
w + αm+1
(
1−
T
T + 1
w
)
,
1− q′ =
T
T + 1
(1− q) + αm+1
(
1−
T
T + 1
(1− q)
)
,
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and
α =
(
1
1 + Ty
)1/m
. (4.3)
The strategy used for the proof of Lemma 4.2 is similar to the one used for the proof of
Lemma 3.2, except that now the calibration of the mixed strategy is in terms of T rather
than λ.
5 Public equilibria
A strategy σi of player i is called public if it depends only on the past public signal, i.e.,
σi = (σit)t≥1 is a behavioral strategy (σ
i
t : (A
i × U)t−1 → ∆(Ai)), such that for each t
σit(a
i
1, u1, a
i
2, u2, . . . , a
i
t−1, ut−1) depends only on u1, . . . , ut−1, and not on a
i
1, . . . , a
i
t−1. A public
equilibrium of the λ-discounted game (resp. of the T stage finite game) is a profile of public
strategies which is an equilibrium of the λ-discounted game (resp. of the T stage finite game).
We denote by Epλ (resp. by E
p
T ) the set of public equilibria of the λ-discounted game (resp. of
the T stage finite game). The case of public equilibria is studied by Fudenberg et al. (1994)
who prove a folk theorem based on a pair-wise identifiability condition, that implies that
deviations by different players induce different probability distributions of public signals. In
our model this condition is not valid, since the deviation of any player in a room produces
the same effect on the signal. Below we prove an anti-folk theorem.
5.1 Three players
Here we assume that n = 1, so that N = {1, 2, 3}. We start with the three-player game
because in this case we have a complete characterization of the set of public equilibria in
the discounted game for small λ and an asymptotic characterization for the finitely repeated
game.
The set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the stage game is
E1 = {(1/4, 1/4, 1/4)} ∪ {(β, 1− β, 0) : β ∈ [0, 1]}
∪ {(β, 0, 1− β) : β ∈ [0, 1]} ∪ {(0, β, 1− β) : β ∈ [0, 1]}.
Its convex hull is
C = conv E1
= conv{(1/4, 1/4, 1/4), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}
= {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3+ : x
1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1, 2x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ 1, x1 + 2x2 + x3 ≥ 1,
x1 + x2 + 2x3 ≥ 1}.
Proposition 5.1. For all 0 < λ ≤ 1, Epλ ⊂ C, and for all 0 < λ ≤ 1/4, E
p
λ = C.
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The above proposition shows that in the discounted game with three players the set
of public equilibrium payoffs coincides with the convex hull of stage-Nash payoffs if λ is
small enough (smaller than 1/4). The next proposition shows that a similar property holds
asymptotically for the finitely repeated game.
Proposition 5.2. For all T ≥ 1, EpT ⊂ C, and limT→∞ E
p
T = C.
5.2 2n + 1 players
Now N = {1, . . . , 2n+ 1} for some integer n. In this case, due to computational complexity,
we cannot obtain characterizations similar to Propositions 5.1 and 5.2. We just give a bound,
which is probably far from being optimal, but is sufficient to show that the public equilibrium
payoffs are bounded away from the null vector.
Proposition 5.3. For any 0 < λ ≤ 1 and z ∈ Epλ , we have∑
i∈N
zi ≥
1
3
.
Proposition 5.4. For all T ≥ 1 and z ∈ EpT , we have∑
i∈N
zi ≥
1
3
.
The two above propositions prove that also in this case private strategies can achieve
equilibrium payoffs that public strategies cannot.
6 Proofs
Section 3. Convergence of Eλ
The symbols α, λ, m, n, s, z, q, y, w, z′, q′, y′, w′ were defined in Section 3.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. By (3.3) we have
λ1/m ≤ α ≤
(
λ
y
)1/m
, (6.1)
hence
(1− λ)w ≤ w′ ≤ (1− λ)w +
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
, (6.2)
(1− λ)(1− q) ≤ 1− q′ ≤ (1− λ)(1− q) +
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
. (6.3)
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When z is as in (4.1), call
W (z) = s(1− q) + (n + 1− s)y + nw. (6.4)
The value W (z) represents the L1 distance between z and eS. By definition W (z) ≥ 0.
Eventually we would like W (z) to be close to 0. Inequalities (6.2) and (6.3) imply
(1− λ)W (z) ≤ W (z′) ≤ (1− λ)W (z) + (n + s)
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
, (6.5)
hence
W (z′)−W (z) ≤ λ
(
−W (z) + (n + s)
λ1/m
y(m+1)/m
)
. (6.6)
Using (6.1) we obtain
λ
1− λ
1− αm+1
αm+1
≥
λ
1− λ
1−
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
=
1
1− λ
y(m+1)/m
λ1/m
(
1−
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m)
=
1
1− λ
(
y
(y
λ
)1/m
− λ
)
.
So since
y ≥ λ1/(m+1), (6.7)
then
y
(y
λ
)1/m
− λ ≥ 1− λ,
therefore we obtain the following inequality:
λ
1− λ
(
1− αm+1
αm+1
)
≥ 1. (6.8)
Now construct a new equilibrium where players play as follows.
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At stage 1
player 1
...
player s

 play R,
player s + 1
...
player n + 1

 play (1− α)L⊕ αR,
player n + 2
...
player 2n + 1

 play L.
If the signal was L at stage 1, then, from stage 2 on, all players play the equilibrium with
payoff z; if the signal was R at stage 1, then each player plays forever what she played at
stage 1.
In order to show that this is indeed an equilibrium, we will show that every player is in
best reply.
Consider player (s + 1) (or any other player in her group). If she plays L at stage 1, her
payoff in the discounted game is (1− λ)y. If she plays R at stage 1, her payoff is
P(L)(λ + (1− λ)y) + P(R)0,
where P(R) indicates the probability that the signal is R at stage 1, and in this case P(R) =
αn−s.
Since α ∈ (0, 1), player (s + 1) is in best response iff
(1− λ)y = (1− αn−s)(λ + (1− λ)y)
iff
1− αn−s =
(1− λ)y
λ + (1− λ)y
iff
αm =
λ
λ + (1− λ)y
,
which is equality (3.3). And then the payoff of player (s + 1) is y ′ = (1− λ)y.
Consider player 1 (or any other player in her group). If she plays L at stage 1, her payoff
is (1− λ)q. If she plays R at stage 1, her payoff is
P(L)(λ + (1− λ)q) + P(R)0,
where in this case P(R) = αn+1−s.
Therefore player 1 is in best response iff
(1− αn+1−s)(λ + (1− λ)q) ≥ (1− λ)q
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iff
λ(1− αm+1) ≥ (1− λ)qαm+1
By (6.8), we know that this inequality is always satisfied.
Consider player (n + 2) (or any other player in her group). If she plays L she gets
P(L)(1− λ)w + P(R)1 = (1− αm+1)(1− λ)w + αm+1
= (1− λ)w + αm+1(1− (1− λ)w),
since here P(R) = αn+1−s.
If she plays R, she gets at most
P(L)(λ + (1− λ)w) + P(all players s + 1, . . . , n + 1 play R)(λ0 + (1− λ)1)
+ P(exactly n− s players among s + 1, . . . , n + 1 play R)(λ0 + (1− λ)0)
= P(L)(λ + (1− λ)w) + αn+1−s(1− λ),
where the last 1 in the first line of the above formula is an upper bound assuming that the
deviator switches to the minority in all future periods, and the 0 in the following line is the
case where players are equally split and the deviator is always in the majority. Now
P(L) = 1− αn+1−s − (n + 1− s)(αn−s − αn+1−s)
= 1 + αn−s(−(n + 1− s)) + αn+1−s(−1 + n + 1− s)
= 1− αn−s(n + 1− s) + (n− s)αn+1−s.
Hence playing R gives player (n + 2) at most
(λ + (1− λ)w)(1− (n + 1− s)αn−s + (n− s)αn+1−s) + (1− λ)αn+1−s.
Therefore player (n + 2) is in best reply iff
(1− λ)w + αm+1(1− (1− λ)w)
≥ (λ + (1− λ)w)(1− (n + 1− s)αn−s + (n− s)αn+1−s) + (1− λ)αn+1−s
iff
(1− λ)w + αm+1(1− (1− λ)w)
≥ (λ + (1− λ)w)(1− (m + 1)αm + mαm+1) + (1− λ)αn+1−s
iff
w(1− λ)(1− αm+1 − 1 + (m + 1)αm −mαm+1) + αm+1 − (1− λ)αm+1
− λ(1− (m + 1)αm + mαm+1) ≥ 0
iff
F (w) := w(1− λ)(m + 1)αm(1− α) + λ(−1 + (m + 1)αm + (1−m)αm+1) ≥ 0.
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The function F is increasing, so F (w) ≥ F (y), since w ≥ y by assumption. By (3.3) we have
αm(1− λ)y = λ(1− αm),
hence
F (y) = y(1− λ)(m + 1)αm(1− α) + λ(−1 + (m + 1)αm + (1−m)αm+1)
= λ(1− αm)(m + 1)(1− α) + λ(−1 + (m + 1)αm + (1−m)αm+1)
= λ
[
(m + 1)(1− α)(1− αm)− 1 + (m + 1)αm + (1−m)αm+1
]
= λ
[
(m + 1)(1− α− αm + αm+1)− 1 + (m + 1)αm + (1−m)αm+1
]
= λ
[
m + 1− α(m + 1) + 2αm+1 − 1
]
= λ
[
m− α(m + 1) + 2αm+1
]
,
One can study the mapping α 7→ m − α(m + 1) + 2αm+1, and show that it is positive for
any value of α in [0, 1]. So F (y) > 0, and player n + 2 is in best reply. Her payoff is
w′ = (1− λ)w + αm+1(1− (1− λ)w).
To conclude the proof, just consider that the payoff of player 1 is
q′ = (1− αm+1)(λ + (1− λ)q),
hence
1− q′ = 1− (1− αm+1)(λ + (1− λ)q)
= 1− (λ + (1− λ)q) + αm+1(λ + (1− λ)q)
= 1− λ− (1− λ)q + αm+1(1− (1− λ)(1− q))
= (1− λ)(1− q) + αm+1(1− (1− λ)(1− q)).
We will use the following notations in the sequel:
k(n, m) =
mm(m + 1)m+1
(2n−m)m(2n + 1)m+1(2m + 1)2m+1
, (6.9)
C =
m
(2n + 1)(2m + 1)
> 0. (6.10)
Lemma 6.1. For a ∈ (0, 1], the condition:
λ ≤ a2m+1k(n, m) (6.11)
implies
λ ≤
(
a
(
1
2n + 1
− C
))m+1
, (6.12)
which in turns implies
λ ≤
1
2n + 1
. (6.13)
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Proof. (6.11) implies (6.12): first consider that (6.11) becomes
λ ≤
a2m+1
(n + s)m
·
mm
(2n + 1)m+1
·
(m + 1)m+1
(2m + 1)2m+1
where the equality stems from (3.2) and (6.9). If (6.11) holds, then
λ
(
(2n + 1)(2m + 1)
a(m + 1)
)m+1
≤
a2m+1mm(m + 1)m+1(2n + 1)m+1(2m + 1)m+1
(2n + 1)m+1(2m + 1)2m+1(n + s)mam+1(m + 1)m+1
=
a2m+1mm
(2m + 1)m(n + s)mam+1
≤
am
(2m + 1)m
≤ 1.
This implies (6.12).
(6.12) implies (6.13): this is immediate, since a ≤ 1.
Lemma 6.2. Fix 0 < a ≤ 1. If
λ ≤ k(n, m)a2m+1, (6.14)
then there exists z ∈ Eλ such that W (z) ≤ a, where W (·) is defined as in (6.4).
Proof. Fix 0 < a ≤ 1, and λ that satisfies (6.14). Consider the following condition
w ≥ y ≥
W (z)
2n + 1
− Ca. (6.15)
Define
Zλ,a = {z = (q, . . . , q︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, y, . . . , y︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1−s
, w, . . . , w︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) ∈ Eλ such that w ≥ y ≥
W (z)
2n + 1
− Ca holds}
First we prove that Zλ,a 6= ∅. In fact for all Q ⊂ {1, . . . , 2n + 1} with {1, . . . , s} ⊂ Q and
card(Q) = n there exists a Nash equilibrium of the stage game with payoff eQ.
By Lemma 6.1
λ ≤
1
2n + 1
,
So it is possible to use time to convexify and obtain exactly the uniform convex com-
bination of (eQ)Q⊃S as a payoff vector in Eλ (see for example Mertens et al. (1994, pp.
194–195)):
z = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, y, . . . , y︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n+1−s
),
with n = s + (2n + 1− s)y.
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This vector z is such that w = y, and W (z) = (2n + 1− s)y, therefore
y ≥
W (z)
2n + 1
≥
W (z)
2n + 1
− Ca,
hence z ∈ Zλ,a.
The set Eλ is a compact set since the strategy sets are compact and the discounted payoff
functions are continuous. Since W is continuous, we obtain that the set Zλ,a is compact.
Fix z ∈ Zλ,a that minimizes W (z). Assume that
W (z) > a. (6.16)
We will prove that this leads to a contradiction.
If W (z) > a, then, by (6.15),
y ≥ a
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)
, (6.17)
and, by Lemma 6.1,
a
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)
≥ λ1/(m+1),
hence Lemma 3.2 can be applied to z.
We will verify that (6.15) holds for z′. Recall (6.5).
W (z′) ≤ (1− λ)W (z) + (n + s)
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
.
Hence
y′ −
W (z′)
2n + 1
+ Ca ≥ (1− λ)y −
1− λ
2n + 1
W (z)−
n + s
2n + 1
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
+ Ca
≥ −(1− λ)Ca + Ca−
n + s
2n + 1
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
= λCa−
n + s
2n + 1
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
≥ λCa−
n + s
2n + 1
·
λ(m+1)/m
a(m+1)/m
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)(m+1)/m , (6.18)
where the second inequality stems from (6.15), and the last one from (6.17).
Expression (6.18) is non-negative iff
λ1/m ≤
Ca(2m+1)/m
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)(m+1)/m
(2n + 1)
n + s
,
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iff
λ ≤
a2m+1Cm
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)m+1
(2n + 1)m
(n + s)m
,
iff
λ ≤
a2m+1Cm (1− (2n + 1)C)m+1
(2n + 1)(n + s)m
,
which is just (6.11). Therefore z′ ∈ Zλ,a.
To find a contradiction we need to show that W (z′) < W (z). By (6.6), (6.16), and (6.17)
we have
W (z′)−W (z) ≤ −λW (z) + (n + s)
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
< −λa + (n + s)
(
λ
y
)(m+1)/m
(6.19)
< −λa +
(n + s)λ(m+1)/m
a(m+1)/m
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)(m+1)/m .
This last expression is non-positive iff
(n + s)λ(m+1)/m
a(m+1)/m
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)(m+1)/m ≤ λa,
iff
λ1/m ≤
a(2m+1)/m
n + s
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)(m+1)/m
,
iff
λ ≤
a2m+1(1− (2n + 1)C)m+1
(n + s)m(2n + 1)m+1
. (6.20)
By (6.11) we have:
λ ≤
a2m+1Cm (1− (2n + 1)C)m+1
(2n + 1)(n + s)m
,
which holds iff
λ ≤
Cm(2n + 1)ma2m+1 (1− (2n + 1)C)m+1
(n + s)m(2n + 1)m+1
.
Since C(2n + 1) < 1, we have that (6.11) implies (6.20).
Lemma 6.2 gives a bound of the order of a2m+1 for the speed of convergence of Eλ to a
set containing the vector eS. Notice that m = n− s represents the distance between eS and
a Nash equilibrium payoff of the one-shot game.
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Lemma 6.3. Fix λ ∈ (0, 1) and d ≥ 1 integer. Let
µ = 1− (1− λ)d ≥ λ. (6.21)
If x1, . . . , xd ∈ Eµ, then
d∑
`=1
λ(1− λ)`−1
1− (1− λ)d
x` ∈ Eλ,
hence in particular Eµ ⊂ Eλ.
Proof. Assume that x1, . . . , xd ∈ Eµ. For ` ∈ {1, . . . , d} let σ
` be an equilibrium of the
µ-discounted game that achieves the payoff x`. We now define a strategy τ which will be an
equilibrium of the λ-discounted game.
Divide the set of stages {1, 2, . . . , } into d equivalence classes B1, B2,. . . , Bd, with B` =
{` + t d, t ∈ N} for every ` in {1, . . . , d}. The strategy τ plays independently on each class.
At class B`, τ forgets all the stages not in B` and plays according to σ
`. For i in N , the
payoff of player i in the λ-discounted game if τ is played is:
γiλ(τ) =
∞∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1Eτ [g
i(at)]
= λ
d∑
`=1
∞∑
t′=0
(1− λ)l+t
′d−1
Eτ [g
i(a`+t′d)]
=
d∑
`=1
λ(1− λ)`−1
(
∞∑
t′=0
(
(1− λ)d
)t′
Eτ [g
i(a`+t′d)]
)
=
d∑
`=1
λ(1− λ)`−1
(
∞∑
t′=0
(1− µ)t
′
Eτ [g
i(a`+t′d)]
)
=
d∑
`=1
λ(1− λ)`−1
µ
(
∞∑
t′=1
µ (1− µ)t
′−1
Eτ [g
i(a`+(t′−1)d)]
)
=
d∑
`=1
λ(1− λ)`−1
µ
x`
=
d∑
`=1
λ(1− λ)`−1
1− (1− λ)d
x`
Hence this is the payoff achieved by strategy τ . In order to see that τ is an equilibrium in
the λ-discounted game, consider that it requires to cycle over d equilibria of the λ-discounted
game. Relation (6.21) and a similar computation ensure that the discounting is properly
taken into account.
Remark 6.4. Since S = conv{eS, S ⊂ N with card(S) ≤ n}, the number of extreme points
of S is
L =
n∑
k=0
(
2n + 1
k
)
= 4n.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. Since S is the set of feasible payoffs, we have, for all λ ∈ (0, 1),
Eλ ⊂ S.
We want to prove that for all ε > 0 there exists λ0 > 0 such that for all λ ≤ λ0, for
all z ∈ S there exists z′′ ∈ Eλ such that ‖z − z
′′‖ ≤ ε. In all the computations we use
‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖1.
Write S = conv{v1, . . . , vL}. Fix ε ∈ (0, 1). There exists d ∈ N such that every element
z ∈ S is at a distance of at most ε from another element z ′ ∈ S that can be written as a
convex combination of v1, . . . , vL with rational coefficients having all d as a denominator.
Define, for every d′, d′′ ∈ {0, . . . , d}
ζ(λ, d′, d′′) =
∣∣∣∣d′d − (1− λ)
d′′(1− (1− λ)d
′
)
1− (1− λ)d
∣∣∣∣ .
We have limλ→0 ζ(λ, d
′, d′′) = 0. So we can find λ0 > 0 such that for all λ ∈ (0, λ0],
1− (1− λ)d ≤ kε2n+1, (6.22)
where k = minm∈{1,...,n} k(n, m), and k(n, m) is defined as in (6.9). Furthermore for all
d′, d′′ ∈ {0, . . . , d} we have
ζ(λ, d′, d′′) ≤ ε. (6.23)
Fix now λ in (0, λ0]. Take z ∈ S. Consider z
′ ∈ S such that ‖z − z′‖ ≤ ε and there exist
integers d1, . . . , dL ≥ 0 such that
z′ =
L∑
`=1
d`
d
v` and
L∑
`=1
d` = d.
Let µ be as in (6.21). By (6.22) we have µ ≤ kε2n+1. Hence for all m ∈ {1, . . . , n} we
have µ ≤ k(n, m)ε2n+1.
By Lemma 6.2, for every ` ∈ {1, . . . , L} there exists z` ∈ Eµ with W (z`) = ‖z` − v`‖ ≤ ε.
By Lemma 6.3 applied to
z1, . . . , z1︸ ︷︷ ︸
d1
, z2, . . . , z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
d2
, . . . , zL, . . . , zL︸ ︷︷ ︸
dL
there exists z′′ ∈ Eλ such that
z′′ =
d∑
i=1
λ(1− λ)i−1
1− (1− λ)d
xi,
where x1, . . . , xd1 = z1, xd1+1, . . . , xd1+d2 = z2, . . . , xd1+···+dL−1+1, . . . , xd = zL.
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Now
z′′ =
d∑
i=1
λ(1− λ)i−1
1− (1− λ)d
xi
=
L∑
`=1
λ
1− (1− λ)d
z`

 d1+···+d`∑
i=d1+···+d`−1+1
(1− λ)i−1


=
λ
1− (1− λ)d
L∑
`=1
z`
(1− λ)d1+···+d`−1 − (1− λ)d1+···+d`
1− (1− λ)
=
1
1− (1− λ)d
L∑
`=1
z`(1− λ)
d1+···+d`−1(1− (1− λ)d`).
We have
‖z − z′′‖ ≤ ‖z − z′‖+ ‖z′ − z′′‖,
and
‖z − z′‖ ≤ ε.
Recall that
z′ =
L∑
`=1
d`
d
v`, and ‖z`‖ ≤ n for each `.
Therefore
z′ − z′′ =
L∑
`=1
(
d`
d
v` − z`
(1− λ)d1+···+d`−1(1− (1− λ)d`)
1− (1− λ)d
)
=
(
L∑
`=1
d`
d
(v` − z`)
)
+
L∑
`=1
z`
(
d`
d
−
(1− λ)d1+···+d`−1(1− (1− λ)d`)
1− (1− λ)d
)
.
Hence
‖z′ − z′′‖ ≤ ε +
∥∥∥∥∥
L∑
`=1
z`
(
d`
d
−
(1− λ)d1+···+d`−1(1− (1− λ)d`)
1− (1− λ)d
)∥∥∥∥∥
≤ ε + n
L∑
l=1
ζ(λ, d`, d1 + · · ·+ d`−1),
≤ ε + nLε,
where the last equality follows from (6.23). Therefore
‖z − z′′‖ ≤ ε(2 + Ln).
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Section 4. Convergence of ET
Proof of Lemma 4.2. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2. We just need to replace
λ with 1/(T + 1).
Lemma 6.5. Fix S with S ⊂ N and card(S) = s ≤ n. For all ε > 0 there exists T ∈ N and
z ∈ ET such that ‖z − eS‖ ≤ ε.
Proof. If s = n, then eS ∈ E1. Assume now that s ≤ n − 1, and w.l.o.g. that eS =
(1, . . . , 1, 0, . . .0). Fix ε > 0, and define
Yε =

z = (q, . . . , q︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, y, . . . , y︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1−s
, w, . . . , w︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) ∈ S, w ≥ y ≥
W (z)
2n + 1
− Cε

 ,
with C as in (6.10) and W (·) as in (6.4). We use ‖ · ‖1, hence W (z) = ‖eS − z‖.
The set Yε is compact. We now prove that, for T large enough, Yε ∩ ET 6= ∅.
Denote by D = card{V, V ⊃ S, card(V ) = n}. In the D-repeated game play at each stage
a Nash pure equilibrium of the one-shot game corresponding to any V such that V ⊃ S and
card(V ) = n. We then obtain some element z ∈ ED with
z = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, y, . . . , y︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n+1−s
),
and
y =
n− s
2n + 1− s
. (6.24)
Take k such that 1/k ≤ Cε, and fix T ≥ kD. By Euclidean division
T = k′D + r, (6.25)
with k′ ≥ k and 0 ≤ r < D.
In the T -repeated game repeat k′ times the D-game and for the last r stages play a Nash
with payoff
(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
).
Then z′ ∈ ET , with
z′ =
k′D
T
z +
r
T
(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
)
=
(
q′, . . . , q′︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, y′, . . . , y′︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1−s
, w′, . . . , w′︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
)
,
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with
q′ =
k′D
T
y′ =
k′D
T
y
w′ =
k′D
T
y +
r
T
.
Therefore, using (6.24) and (6.25), we obtain
W (z′) = s
(
1−
k′D
T
)
+ (n + 1− s)
k′D
T
y + n
k′D
T
y +
nr
T
= s
r
T
+
nr
T
+ (n− s)
k′D
T
,
and
y′ −
W (z′)
2n + 1
+ Cε =
k′D
T
n− s
2n + 1− s
−
1
2n + 1
(
(s + n)
r
T
+ (n− s)
k′D
T
)
+ Cε
=
k′D
T
(n− s)
(
1
2n + 1− s
−
1
2n + 1
)
−
(s + n)
(2n + 1)
r
T
+ Cε
≥ −
(s + n)r
(2n + 1)T
+ Cε
≥ −
r
T
+ Cε
≥ −
1
k
+ Cε
≥ 0.
Hence z′ ∈ ET ∩ Yε. This proves that ET ∩ Yε 6= ∅ .
For all T ≥ kD =: T0, ET∩Yε is a non-empty compact subset of R
N , and W is continuous.
We define
βT = min{W (z), z ∈ ET ∩ Yε}.
Fix T ≥ T0 and such that
1
T + 1
≤ k(n, m)ε2m+1.
Assume that βT > ε. Then take z ∈ ET ∩ Yε such that W (z) = βT > ε.
We have z = (q, . . . , q, y, . . . , y, w . . . , w), with
w ≥ y ≥
W (z)
2n + 1
− Cε ≥ ε
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)
.
As in Lemma 6.1, we have
ε
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)
≥
(
1
T + 1
)1/(m+1)
.
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So
w ≥ y ≥
(
1
T + 1
)1/(m+1)
,
and we can apply Lemma 4.2 to z. With computations similar to the ones used in the proof
of Lemma 6.2, we find z′ ∈ ET+1 ∩ Yε such that
W (z′)−W (z) < −
ε
T + 1
+
(n + s)
(
1
T + 1
)(m+1)/m
ε(m+1)/m
(
1
2n + 1
− C
)(m+1)/m =: νT ,
where the inequality comes from an argument similar to (6.19).
We have βT+1 − βT ≤ W (z
′)−W (z) < νT , and∑
T
νT = −∞.
Therefore if we assume that for all T ≥ T0, βT > ε, we get that βT → −∞, which is a
contradiction. Therefore there exists T such that βT ≤ ε.
Lemma 6.6. For all S ⊂ N with card(S) ≤ n, for all ε > 0 there exists T0 such that for all
T ≥ T0 there exists z ∈ ET with ‖z − eS‖ ≤ ε.
Proof. By Lemma 6.5 there exist T0 and z ∈ ET0 such that ‖z − eS‖ ≤ ε.
Take k such that
k ≥
2n
ε
.
Take T ≥ kT0. By Euclidean division T = k
′T0 + r, with k
′ ≥ k and r ∈ {0, . . . , T0 − 1}.
In the T -repeated game play the T0-repeated game k
′ times and for the last r stages play
a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game with payoff x.
Then z′ ∈ ET with
z′ =
k′T0
T
z +
r
T
x.
We have
‖z′ − z‖ =
∥∥∥ r
T
(−z) +
r
T
x
∥∥∥
=
r
T
‖x− z‖
≤
1
k
2n
≤ ε,
so:
‖z′ − eS‖ ≤ ‖z
′ − z‖ + ε ≤ 2ε.
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. Recall that S = conv{eS, S ⊂ N such that card(S) ≤ n}, and fix
ε > 0. There exists K such that any element of S is at distance at most ε from a convex
combination of elements eS with coefficients of the type h/K, with h ∈ {0, ..., K}. By
Lemma 6.6 , there exists T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, for all S ⊂ N with card(S) ≤ n,
there exists z in ET with ‖z − eS‖ ≤ ε. Since EKT contains all the convex combinations of
points of ET with coefficients of the type h/K, we have that for all T ≥ T0, for all z ∈ S,
d(z, EKT ) ≤ ε + ε = 2ε. Proceeding to chop the remainder as in the proof of Lemma 6.6
gives the conclusion.
Section 5. Public equilibria
We start with the case of three players (n = 1). Consider the stage game, assume that every
player i ∈ N chooses L with probability αi ∈ [0, 1], and denote α = (α1, α2, α3). The induced
law on the public signal can be represented by the probability that L is the most crowded
room, which we denote by
`(α) = α1α2α3 + α1α2(1− α3) + α1(1− α2)α3 + (1− α1)α2α3,
= α1α2 + α1(1− α2)α3 + (1− α1)α2α3.
For every α = (α1, α2, α3) ∈ [0, 1]3 define
Z(α) = {β = (β1, β2, β3) ∈ [0, 1]3 : `(α−1, β1) = `(α−2, β2) = `(α−3, β3)}. (6.26)
The set Z(α) denotes the set of deviations from α that induce the same public signal. It
was first introduced by Tomala (1998, Definition 4.1), and was used afterwards by Renault
and Tomala (2004).
The idea is the following: at some stage the players are supposed to play according to α.
Consider the following three deviations:
(i) player 1 plays β1 instead of α1,
(ii) player 2 plays β2 instead of α2,
(iii) player 3 plays β3 instead of α3.
By (6.26) the three deviations induce the same law of the public signal, hence they induce
the same subsequent play. Even if the players notice that a deviation occurred, they will be
unable to determine who deviated, hence, in equilibrium, the subsequent play should punish
in an appropriate way all 3 players.
The following lemma is the key to the proofs of Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.2.
Lemma 6.7. For all α ∈ [0, 1]3 there exists β ∈ Z(α) such that g1(α−1, β1) + g2(α−2, β2) +
2g3(α−3, β3) ≥ 1.
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Proof. Fix α = (α1, α2, α3) ∈ [0, 1]3. Assume, w.l.o.g. that g1(α) + g2(α) + 2g3(α) < 1, and
that `(α) ≥ 1/2. We have
g3(α) < 1− g1(α)− g2(α)− g3(α),
hence the probability that player 3 is alone (= g3(α)) is lower than the probability that
nobody is alone (= 1− g1(α)− g2(α)− g3(α)). So
α3(1− α1)(1− α2) + (1− α3)α1α2 < α1α2α3 + (1− α1)(1− α2)(1− α3),
which implies
α1α2(1− 2α3) < (1− α1)(1− α2)(1− 2α3), (6.27)
hence α3 6= 1/2.
If α3 < 1/2, then, by (6.27), α1α2 < (1− α1)(1− α2), but in this case
`(α) = α1α2 + α1α3(1− α2) + (1− α1)α2α3 (6.28)
< (1− α1)(1− α2) + α1(1− α2)(1− α3) + (1− α1)α2(1− α3)
= 1− `(α),
so 2`(α) < 1, which is a contradiction.
Hence necessarily we have α3 > 1/2, and, (6.27) becomes:
α1α2 > (1− α1)(1− α2),
which gives
α1 + α2 > 1.
By symmetry assume w.l.o.g. that α1 ≥ α2. We now have two cases.
Case 1. α2 ≥ α3.
In this case we have
α1 ≥ α2 ≥ α3 > 1/2. (6.29)
Put β3 = 0. Then `(α−3, β3) = α1α2.
Define β1 ∈ [0, α1] in such a way that `(α−1, β1) = α1α2, namely, such that
α2α3 + β1((1− α2)α3 + α2(1− α3)) = α1α2.
This is possible since α2α3 + 0 ≤ α1α2 and, by (6.28),
α2α3 + α1((1− α2)α3 + α2(1− α3)) = `(α) ≥ α1α2.
Similarly define β2 ∈ [0, α2] in such a way that `(α−2, β2) = α1α2.
We have
g1(α−1, β1) = α2α3 + β1(1− α2 − α3),
g2(α−2, β2) = α1α3 + β2(1− α1 − α3),
g3(α−3, β3) = α1α2.
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Since, by (6.29), α2 + α3 > 1 and β1 ≤ α1, we have
g1(α−1, β1) ≥ α2α3 + α1(1− α2 − α3).
Similarly
g2(α−2, β2) ≥ α1α3 + α2(1− α1 − α3).
So
g1(α−1, β1) + g2(α−2, β2) + 2g3(α−3, β3)
≥ α2α3 + α1(1− α2 − α3) + α1α3 + α2(1− α1 − α3) + 2α1α2
= α1 + α2
> 1,
where the last inequality stems from (6.29).
Case 2. α2 < α3.
We have
α3 >
1
2
, α1 + α2 > 1, (6.30)
and
((α1 ≥ α3 > α2) or (α3 ≥ α1 ≥ α2)).
Put β2 = 0. So
`(α−2, β2) = α1α3 = g2(α−2, β2).
Put
β1 =
(α1 − α2)α3
α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2)
and β3 =
(α3 − α2)α1
α1(1− α2) + α2(1− α1)
.
We have
`(α−1, β1) = `(α−2, β2) = `(α−3, β3) = α1α3,
β1 ∈ [0, α1], and β3 ∈ [0, α3].
Denote by
A = 2g3(α−3, β3) + g1(α−1, β1) + g2(α−2, β2)
= 2(α1α2 + β3(1− α1 − α2)) + α2α3 + β1(1− α2 − α3) + α1α3.
We want to prove that A ≥ 1.
Since β3 ≤ α3 and 1− α1 − α2 < 0, we have
A ≥ 2α1α2 + 2α3(1− α1 − α2) + α2α3 + β1(1− α2 − α3) + α1α3
= 2α1α2 − α2α3 − α1α3 + 2α3 + β1(1− α2 − α3)
= 2α1α2 − α2α3 − α1α3 + 2α3 +
(α1 − α2)α3(1− α2 − α3)
α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2)
(6.31)
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And we denote this last quantity by B(α1, α2, α3). Notice that B is an affine function of α1,
and that, by (6.30), α1 ∈ [1− α2, 1]. Denote by
δ = α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2) > 0.
Then
B(1, α2, α3) = 2α2 − α2α3 − α3 + 2α3 +
(1− α2)α3(1− α2 − α3)
α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2)
= 2α2 + α3(1− α2)
(
1 +
1− α2 − α3
α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2)
)
= 2α2 +
α3(1− α2)(1− 2α2α3)
α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2)
=
1
δ
(
2(α2)2(1− α3) + 2α2α3(1− α2) + α3(1− α2)− 2α2(α3)2(1− α2)
)
=
1
δ
(
α3(1− α2) + 2α2
(
α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2)− (α3)2(1− α2)
))
=
1
δ
(
α3(1− α2) + 2α2(1− α3)
(
α2 + α3(1− α2)
))
.
We have α2 + α3(1− α2) ≥ α3 > 1/2, so
B(1, α2, α3) ≥
1
δ
(
α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2)
)
= 1. (6.32)
On the other hand
B(1− α2, α2, α3) = 2(1− α2)α2 − α2α3 − (1− α2)α3 + 2α3 +
(1− 2α2)α3(1− α2 − α3)
α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2)
=
1
δ
[(
2(1− α2)α2 + α3
) (
α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2)
)
+(1− 2α2)α3(1− α2 − α3)
]
.
Hence
δ(B(1− α2, α2, α3)− 1) =
(
2(1− α2)α2 + (α3 − 1)
) (
α2(1− α3) + α3(1− α2)
)
+ (1− 2α2)α3(1− α2 − α3)
= α2
[
2α2(1− α2)− 1 + α3
(
2(α2)2 + 2(1− α2)2
)]
.
Since α3 > 1/2, we have
δ(B(1− α2, α2, α3)− 1) ≥ α2
(
2(1− α2)α2 − 1 + (α2)2 + (1− α2)2
)
= 0.
As a consequence
B(1− α2, α2, α3) ≥ 1.
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Since the function B is affine in its first argument, and, by (6.32), B(1, α2, α3) ≥ 1, inequal-
ity (6.31) yields
A ≥ B(α1, α2, α3) ≥ 1.
Corollary 6.8. If one of the following condition holds
(i) z ∈ Epλ,
(ii) z ∈ EpT ,
then z1 + z2 + 2z3 ≥ 1.
Proof. (i): Let σ be a public equilibrium of the λ-discounted game.
For every t ≥ 0 and for every public history ht ∈ {L, R}
t denote by α(ht) = (α
1(ht), α
2(ht), α
3(ht))
the mixed action profile that σ requires to play at stage t+1, after the public history ht has
occurred. Using Lemma 6.7 it is possible to define β(ht) ∈ Z(α(ht)) such that
g1(α−1(ht), β
1(ht)) + g
2(α−2(ht), β
2(ht)) + 2g
3(α−3(ht), β
3(ht)) ≥ 1.
For i ∈ N define τ i the strategy of player i that, for every t ≥ 0 and for every public
history ht ∈ {L, R}
t, plays according to βi(ht) at stage t + 1 if ht has previously occurred.
By construction (σ−1, τ 1), (σ−2, τ 2), (σ−3, τ 3) induce the same distribution on the sequences
of public signals. Moreover for all t ≥ 0 and for all ht ∈ {L, R}
t we have
Eσ−1 ,τ1[g
1(at+1)|ht] + Eσ−2,τ2 [g
2(at+1)|ht] + 2Eσ−3 ,τ3[g
3(at+1)|ht] ≥ 1,
where at+1 denotes the random variable corresponding to the action profile at time t + 1.
Taking expectations, we obtain
Eσ−1 ,τ1[g
1(at+1)] + Eσ−2 ,τ2[g
2(at+1)] + 2Eσ−3 ,τ3[g
3(at+1)] ≥ 1.
So
γ1λ(σ
−1, τ 1) + γ2λ(σ
−2, τ 2) + 2γ3λ(σ
−3, τ 3) ≥ 1.
By the equilibrium property
γ1λ(σ) + γ
2
λ(σ) + 2γ
3
λ(σ) ≥ 1.
(ii): The proof is similar.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Let z ∈ Epλ for some 0 < λ ≤ 1. By Corollary 6.8 we have
z1 + z2 + 2z3 ≥ 1. By symmetry we have also z1 + 2z2 + z3 ≥ 1 and 2z1 + z2 + z3 ≥ 1. Since
z is feasible, we have z1 + z2 + z3 ≤ 1, so z ∈ C. Hence Epλ ⊂ C.
Assume now that 0 < λ ≤ 1/4. Take z ∈ C. Since C is just the convex hull of the
Nash-payoffs of the one-shot game, it is possible to find non-negative numbers µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4
such that
z = µ1(1, 0, 0) + µ2(0, 1, 0) + µ3(0, 0, 1) + µ4
(
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
)
,
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and
4∑
j=1
µj = 1.
We now use the construction described in Mertens et al. (1994, Page 194, proof of Theorem
4.2). One of the µj is at least 1/4, and λ ≤ 1/4, so it is possible to write
z = λd1 + (1− λ)f1,
with d1 ∈
{
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1),
(
1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
)}
and f1 ∈ conv
{
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1),
(
1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
)}
.
By applying the same argument to f1 we obtain inductively a sequence (dt)t≥1 of vectors in{
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1),
(
1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
)}
such that
z =
∑
t≥1
λ(1− λ)t−1dt.
Playing at every stage t according to the one-shot Nash equilibrium with payoff dt gives a
public equilibrium of the λ-discounted game with payoff z. Hence C = Epλ if λ ≤ 1/4.
The proof of Proposition 5.2 is easier and is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. By compactness of the set of public strategies and continuity of
the discounted payoff function, we know that the set Epλ is compact.
Consider a public equilibrium σ = (σi)i∈N of the λ-discounted game that minimizes the
sum of the players’ discounted payoffs in Epλ . Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ) <
1
3
.
For i ∈ N denote by αi ∈ [0, 1] the probability that player i plays L at stage 1. Using the
mixed action profile (αi)i∈N , for every player i ∈ N call:
• ai the probability that at stage 1 at most (n − 1) players in N \ {i} play L (i.e., at
least (n + 1) players in N \ {i} play R),
• bi the probability that at stage 1 exactly n players in N \ {i} play L (i.e., exactly n
players in N \ {i} play R),
• ci the probability that at stage 1 at least (n+1) players in N \{i} play L (i.e., at most
(n− 1) players in N \ {i} play R).
Of course ai + bi + ci = 1, and gi(α) = aiαi + ci(1 − αi). The probability that L is the
most crowded room at stage 1 is Pα(L) = c
i + biαi (for every player i), and similarly the
probability that R is the most crowded room at stage 1 is Pα(R) = a
i + bi(1− αi).
We now define continuation payoffs. Denote by ui (resp vi) the discounted continuation
payoff of player i from stage 2 on if L (resp R) was the most crowded room at stage 1. If
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Pα(L) > 0 (resp Pα(R) > 0), then the continuation strategy after L (resp after R) is a public
equilibrium payoff, so∑
i∈N
ui ≥
∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ) (resp
∑
i∈N
vi ≥
∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ)),
since σ is the public equilibrium that minimizes the sum of players’ payoffs.
If Pα(L) = 0, then at stage 1 at least (n + 1) players play R with probability 1. By the
equilibrium condition, n players will then play L with probability 1 at the first stage and
then ∑
i∈N
gi(α) = n,
and ∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ) = λ
∑
i∈N
gi(α) + (1− λ)
∑
i∈N
vi
≥ λn + (1− λ)
∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ).
Hence ∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ) ≥ n.
This is a contradiction, therefore it must be Pα(L) > 0 (and, by symmetry, Pα(R) > 0).
We have for every i ∈ N
γiλ(σ) = λg
i(α) + (1− λ)Pα(L)u
i + (1− λ)Pα(R)v
i.
So ∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ) = λ
∑
i∈N
gi(α) + (1− λ)Pα(L)
∑
i∈N
ui + (1− λ)Pα(R)
∑
i∈N
vi
≥ λ
∑
i∈N
gi(α) + (1− λ)
∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ).
Hence ∑
i∈N
gi(α) ≤
∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ) <
1
3
. (6.33)
With probability greater than 2/3 all players are in the same room at stage 1. W.l.o.g.
we assume that with probability greater than 1/3 all players are in room R at stage 1. This
implies that for every i
ai(1− αi) >
1
3
, (6.34)
and in particular every player i plays R with positive probability at stage 1. Consequently
γiλ(σ) is the payoff obtained by player i when she chooses R at stage 1.
γiλ(σ) = a
i(λ0 + (1− λ)vi) + bi(λ0 + (1− λ)vi) + ci(λ1 + (1− λ)ui)
= λci + (1− λ)ciui + (1− λ)(ai + bi)vi.
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Denote by wi the payoff obtained by player i if she plays L at stage 1 and then follows
σi, whereas all the other players adopt σ. Then
wi = ai(λ1 + (1− λ)vi) + bi(λ0 + (1− λ)ui) + ci(λ0 + (1− λ)ui)
= λai + (1− λ)aivi + (1− λ)(bi + ci)ui. (6.35)
By the equilibrium condition γiλ(σ) ≥ w
i, so
λ(ci − ai) ≥ (1− λ)(−bivi + biui)
= bi(1− λ)(ui − vi). (6.36)
We know by (6.34) that ai(1−αi) > 1/3, and by (6.33) that gi(α) = aiαi+ci(1−αi) < 1/3.
Hence ai(1 − αi) > ci(1 − αi) and ai > ci. Using (6.36) we obtain that ui − vi < 0, i.e.,
ui < vi.
Since ai + bi + ci = 1, we have
aivi + (bi + ci)ui ≥ min(ui, vi) = ui,
and (6.35) gives
γiλ(σ) ≥ w
i ≥ λai + (1− λ)ui.
Adding up we obtain ∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ) ≥ λ
∑
i∈N
ai + (1− λ)
∑
i∈N
ui
≥ λ
∑
i∈N
ai + (1− λ)
∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ).
Hence
1
3
>
∑
i∈N
γiλ(σ) ≥
∑
i∈N
ai.
From (6.34) we have ai > 1/3, so we obtain
1
3
> (2n + 1)
1
3
,
which is clearly false.
Proof of Proposition 5.4. We prove the result by induction on T . For T = 1 the public
equilibria are just the Nash equilibria of the stage game. The sum of equilibrium payoffs is
minimal when all players use the mixed strategy 1
2
L ⊕ 1
2
R. In this case for each player the
probability that she is in the minority room is an increasing function of N . When N = 3
this probability is 1/4. Therefore
∑
i∈N γ
i
T (σ) ≥ N/4 ≥ 1/3.
Hence the result is true for T = 1. Assume that it is true for T − 1, but not for
T , where T ≥ 2 is fixed. Let σ be a public equilibrium of the T -repeated game such that∑
i∈N γ
i
T (σ) < 1/3. A proof similar to the proof of Proposition 5.3 yields a contradiction.
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